

The British Franciscan Tradition
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THE SCHOOLMEN 1220 – 1350

SCHOLASTICISM AND THE MENDICANT ORDERS

With very few exceptions, all the men who contributed to the intellectual life of the Middle Ages were churchmen. The laity slowly built up a vigorous political and economic system, and in the later Middle Ages there was an important lay literature, very different from that of the Church. But it is not until Dante (1265-1321) that we find a layman writing with full knowledge of the ecclesiastical philosophy of his time. Until the fourteenth century, ecclesiastics had a virtual monopoly of philosophy, and philosophy, accordingly, was written from the standpoint of the Church. The teaching of Augustine's *The City of God* was still influential. The Church represented the City of God, and politically philosophers stood for the interests of the Church. Philosophy was concerned to defend the faith, and invoked reason to enable it to argue with those who, like the Muslims, did not accept the validity of the Christian revelation. By this invocation of reason the philosophers stood to be judged, not merely as theologians, but as inventors of systems designed to appeal to men of no matter what creed

Scholasticism means that system of theology and philosophy that was taught in medieval European universities, based on Aristotelian logic and the writings of the early church fathers, and having a strong emphasis on tradition and dogma. Its practitioners are known as scholastics or schoolmen. It began early in the twelfth century with Peter Abelard (1097-1142). As a philosophic school it had certain definite characteristics. First, it was confined within the limits of what appeared to the writer to be orthodoxy; if his views were condemned by a council, he was usually willing to retract. This is not to be attributed entirely to cowardice, it is analogous to the submission of a judge to the decision of a Court of Appeal. Second, within the limits of orthodoxy, Aristotle, who gradually became more fully known during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was increasingly accepted as the supreme authority, Plato no longer holding the first place. Third, there was a great belief in dialectic and in syllogistic reasoning; the general temper of the scholastics was minute and disputatious rather than mystical.

The Church in the early thirteenth century was in danger of a revolt scarcely less formidable than that of the sixteenth. From this it was saved, very largely, by the rise of the mendicant orders. St. Dominic (1170-1221) and St. Francis (1181-1226) did much more for orthodoxy than was done by even the most vigorous popes. The Dominicans were even more active than the Franciscans in the work of the Inquisition. They performed, however, a valuable service to mankind by their devotion to learning. This was no part of St. Dominic's intention; he had decreed that his friars were 'not to learn secular sciences or liberal arts except by dispensation.' This rule was abrogated in 1259, after which everything was done to make a studious life easy for Dominicans. Manual labour was no part of their duties, and the hours of devotion were shortened to give them more time for study. They devoted themselves to reconciling Aristotle and Christ. Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) and his pupil Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), both

Dominicans, accomplished this task as well as it is capable of being accomplished. The authority of Aquinas was so overwhelming that subsequent Dominicans did not achieve much in philosophy. Though Francis, even more than Dominic, had disapproved of learning, the Friars Minor had also moved into the universities even during Francis's lifetime, and were soon to make their mark. As we shall see the three most important scholastic philosophers after Aquinas were all Franciscans, and British to boot: Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William of Occam. The reason for this is far from obvious and we might discuss.

PARIS

In the early thirteenth century the universities were young institutions, jealous of their authority. A *universitas* was no more than guild of teachers, with its own constitution and a closed membership, run by a council of 'regent masters'. (The college system at Oxford and Cambridge did not then exist: Merton at Oxford was founded in 1264 and its buildings date to the 1280s.) When the Friars arrived in the university towns they set up their own schools, each of which was effectively a university in its own right. Inevitably these became rivals to the universities proper. This problem first became acute in Paris where by 1219 the Dominicans were already founding a school. The Franciscans followed in 1225 when four doctors of Paris University took the Franciscan habit and set up on their own. In 1229 a dispute arose between the university and the mendicant schools which led to the university itself leaving Paris for a time. After this the Friars and the university were to remain at loggerheads for decades. This story is relevant because of the four doctors who became Franciscan friars in Paris, two were certainly English and possibly all four. Their leader was **Haymo of Faversham** (ca.1180-1243) who soon became guardian of the Paris house. By 1232 he had moved to Oxford and was to lecture also at Tours, Bologna and Padua. In 1239 he became famous for leading the group who ended the rule of Brother Elias as Minister General. Elias's successor Albert of Pisa died within the year and Haymo succeeded him. In the few years remaining of Haymo's life he tried to make the Order more democratic, promoting opportunities for study and preaching, and ensuring that control of the Order lay in the hands of priests rather than laymen. Of his teaching little survives, and his most enduring legacy lies in having produced a revised edition of the Breviary which was later adopted by the whole Roman Catholic Church. In our day Brother Tristram SSF performed the same service for the Church of England

Meanwhile the reputation of the Franciscan school in Paris had risen greatly when one of the leading theologians of the University decided to join the Order - another Englishman named **Alexander of Hales** (ca. 1185-1244). Alexander was a near contemporary of Haymo having been born in Halesowen in the West Midlands (Dudley) of a fairly well-to-do family. After studying in Paris he took his MA around 1210, and became successively Canon of St Paul's in London and Archdeacon of Coventry. By 1236 he was one of the leading theologians of the university in Paris and caused a great stir in the academic world by joining the Friars Minor. He took charge of the Franciscan school and quickly gathered round him some of the brightest students, who were later to include Bonaventure. But after only two years he handed over the chair to a colleague, devoted himself to writing, and died around 1244. Alexander was an innovative theologian and one of the first to grapple with the newly translated writings of Aristotle.

His other sources included Anselm (*ca.* 1033-1109) and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153). One of the doctrines he specially developed was the sacramental character of baptism, confirmation and ordination, eventually defined as a dogma by the Council of Trent (1545-63). His disputations prior to becoming a friar cover 1600 pages in their modern edition and when he took over the Franciscan school in Paris he began a *Summa theologiae* of his own. This massive work, unfinished at his death, was described by Roger Bacon as weighing as much as a horse - but sarcasm of that kind was typical of Bacon. It was totally eclipsed by Aquinas' work of the same name begun twenty years later, and also unfinished at the author's death in 1274. But Aquinas himself had recognised Alexander as a master.

OXFORD

The story now shifts to Oxford. The Franciscans had arrived there in 1224 and after five years the order had grown so rapidly that the Minister Provincial, Agnellus of Pisa, decided to found a school for them. There were several friars who might have been chosen as professor. But, as we have learned from the companion paper by Gordon Plumb, Agnellus aimed high and invited the most distinguished lecturer in the university, Robert Grosseteste (1175-1253), to occupy the chair. Robert held this post until he was appointed Bishop of Lincoln in 1235 and made the Franciscan school the most important in Oxford. But he was not a friar, nor were his three immediate successors: Peter who became Bishop of Aberdeen; Roger of Wexford, later Bishop of Lichfield, and Thomas of Wales, later Bishop of St. David's. This succession of secular masters meant that the Franciscan school at Oxford became part of the university, rather than in competition with it as had happened at Paris. But after 18 years the man chosen as fourth regent master was **Adam Marsh** (1200-1259). He was a friend and pupil of Grosseteste, and had become a friar Minor in 1232. In 1247-8 he succeeded Thomas of Wales in the professorial chair, holding office until 1250 and then again in 1252-3, after which he devoted his life to public service. Roger Bacon, his pupil, spoke of Adam Marsh as one of the few great philosophers that the world had known, and particularly admired his attainments in theology and mathematics. But little of his work survives except his letters. He shrank from high office, never becoming a bishop, or even Minister of the English Province. But he had great influence on the statesmen of his day and did much to guide both the court and the opposition in everything affecting the interests of the church. He was the close friend and spiritual director of Simon de Montfort, on the strength of which Brother Edward SSF claimed Simon as a tertiary. Of this, however, there is no evidence. It is a strange fact that there is almost nothing, in any of the extant source materials, of any positive allusion to the Third Order in England before the Reformation. It seems that tertiaries were no keener then to seek the limelight than they have been in our time. Only two tertiary's names seem to be known unless one counts Katherine of Aragon. But she had probably joined the Third Order in Spain (her mother was also a tertiary) and became, in one sense, a cause of the English Reformation!

Another English Franciscan Schoolman of note is John **Pecham**. He was born about 1230 (at Patcham in Sussex), educated at Lewes Priory and became a friar in 1250. He studied at Oxford and then in Paris where he taught theology and disputed with Aquinas. About 1272 he returned to Oxford and lectured as regent until 1276 when rapid

promotion followed. He was appointed Minister Provincial but after two years was called to Rome as theological lecturer in the schools of the Papal Palace. Next year the see of Canterbury fell vacant and he was appointed archbishop, a post which he held for the 13 years until he died in 1292. He was a prolific author who published on philosophy, biblical studies and science; also hymns, devotional works, controversial pamphlets and a little poetry. But he was primarily a philosopher, owing much to Bonaventure who had taught him in Paris. He tried to reconcile the newly fashionable Aristotelian thought with that of Plato. John Moorman comments 'if he did not always achieve great success at least he prepared the way for the later work of Duns Scotus'.

We now turn to the three super-stars of the Franciscan schoolmen, all of them Oxford men:

ROGER BACON

Roger Bacon (*ca.* 1214-1294) was not greatly admired in his own day, but in modern times has been praised far beyond his deserts. He was not so much a philosopher, in the narrow sense, as a man of universal learning with a passion for mathematics and science. Science, in his day, was mixed up with alchemy, and thought to be involved with black arts. Bacon was constantly getting into trouble through being suspected of heresy and magic. He was born in Ilchester, studied at Oxford and lectured there on Aristotle, then moved to Paris and in about 1256 he became a friar. In 1257 Bonaventure, then Minister General, put him under surveillance, and forbade him to publish. In 1265 his friend Cardinal Guy de Foulques was elected Pope Clement IV and ordered Bacon to write to him on the place of philosophy within theology. He then produced, in a very short time, three books: *Opus Majus*, *Opus Minus*, and *Opus Tertium*. These seem to have made a good impression, and in 1268 he was allowed to return to Oxford. But nothing could teach him caution. He made a practice of contemptuous criticism of all the most learned of his contemporaries: in particular, he maintained that the translators from Greek and Arabic were grossly incompetent. In 1271, he wrote a book called *Compendium Studii Philosophiae*, in which he attacked clerical ignorance. This did nothing to add to his popularity among his colleagues, and in 1278 his books were condemned by the then Minister General of the Order, Jerome of Ascoli and he was put under house arrest. After a year or so he returned to Oxford and died there in 1294. By the 18th Century 'Friar Bacon's Study' alongside Folly Bridge had become a place of pilgrimage for scientists.

Bacon was encyclopaedic in his learning, but not systematic. Unlike most philosophers of the time, he valued experiment highly, and illustrated its importance by the theory of the rainbow. He wrote well on geography; Columbus read this part of his work, and was influenced by it. He was a good mathematician, quoting the sixth and ninth books of Euclid. He wrote on perspective, following Arabic sources. Logic he thought a useless study; alchemy, on the other hand, he valued enough to write on it. To give an idea of his scope and method, here is a summary of some parts of the *Opus Majus*. There are, he says, four causes of ignorance: First, the example of frail and unsuited authority. (The work being written for the Pope, he is careful to say that this does not include the Church.) Second, the influence of custom. Third, the opinion of the un-learned crowd. (This, one gathers, includes all his contemporaries except himself.)

Fourth, the concealment of one's ignorance in a display of apparent wisdom. From these four plagues, of which the fourth is the worst, spring all human evils. In supporting an opinion, it is a mistake to argue from the wisdom of our ancestors, or from custom, or from common belief. In support of this view he quotes Seneca, Cicero, Avicenna, Averroes, Adelard of Bath, St. Jerome, and St. Chrysostom. These authorities, he seems to think, suffice to prove that one should not respect authority. His respect for Aristotle is great, but not unbounded. 'Only Aristotle, together with his followers, has been called philosopher in the judgment of all wise men.' Like almost all his contemporaries, he uses the designation, 'The Philosopher,' when he speaks of Aristotle, but even he, we are told, did not come to the limit of human wisdom. After him, Avicenna was 'the prince and leader of philosophy', though he did not fully understand the rainbow, because he did not recognize its final cause, which, according to Genesis, is the dissipation of aqueous vapour. (Nevertheless, when Bacon comes to treat of the rainbow, he quotes Avicenna with great admiration.) Every now and then he says something that has a flavour of orthodoxy, such as that the only perfect wisdom is in the Scriptures, as explained by canon law and philosophy. But he sounds more sincere when he says that there is no objection to getting knowledge from the heathen; in addition to Avicenna and Averroes, he quotes Al-farabi very often, and Albumazar and others from time to time. Albumazar is quoted to prove that mathematics was known before the Flood by Noah and his sons. Bacon praises mathematics as the sole (un-revealed) source of certitude, as needed for astronomy and astrology.

Bacon followed Averroes in holding that the active intellect is a substance separated from the soul in essence. He quotes various eminent divines, among them Grosseteste, as also supporting this opinion, which is contrary to that of Aquinas. Apparently contrary passages in Aristotle, he says, are due to mistranslation. He does not quote Plato at first hand, but at second hand through Cicero, or at third hand through the Arabs. In modern times Bacon has been praised because he valued experiment, as a source of knowledge, more than argument. Certainly his interests, and his way of dealing with subjects, were very different from those of the typical scholastics. His encyclopaedic tendencies are like those of the Arabic writers, who evidently influenced him more profoundly than they did most other Christian philosophers. They, like him, were interested in science, and believed in magic and astrology, whereas Christians thought magic wicked and astrology a delusion. He is astonishing because he differs so widely from other medieval Christian philosophers, but he had little influence in his own time, and was not as scientific as is sometimes thought. English writers used to say that he invented gunpowder, but the truth is that while he may have experimented and certainly wrote about it the invention dates back to Chinese Taoist monks in the 9th century, and was transmitted to Europe *via* the Mongols and Arabs.

DUNS SCOTUS

Duns Scotus (*ca.* 1265-1308) carried on the Franciscan controversy with Aquinas. He was probably born at Duns in Berwickshire, became a Franciscan at Oxford, and taught also at Cambridge and Paris. Against Aquinas, he defended the Immaculate Conception, and in this the University of Paris and ultimately the whole Roman Catholic Church agreed with him. His differences from Aquinas come from a larger admixture of

Platonism (via Augustine) in his philosophy. He discusses, for example, the question 'Whether any sure and pure truth can be known naturally by the understanding of the wayfarer without the special illumination of the uncreated light?' And he argues that it cannot. He supports this view, in his opening argument, solely by quotations from St. Augustine; the only difficulty he finds is Romans 1: 20: 'The invisible things of God, understood by means of those things that have been made, are clearly comprehended from the creation of the world'.

Duns was a moderate realist. He believed in free will and had leanings towards Pelagius (*ca.* 320-430), the Celtic monk (possibly Welsh), who had questioned original sin and thought that when men acted virtuously it was by reason of their own moral effort. Duns held that *being* is no different from *essence*. He was mainly interested in *evidence*, *i.e.* the kinds of things that can be known without proof. Of these there are three kinds: (1) principles known by themselves, (2) things known by experience, (3) our own actions. But without divine illumination we can know nothing. Duns held that, since there is no difference between being and essence, the 'principle of individuation' - *i.e.* that which makes one thing not identical with another - must be form, not matter. This 'principle of individuation' was one of the important problems of scholastic philosophy. In various forms, it has remained a problem to the present day. .

I am far out of my depth here. Bertrand Russell states the issue as follows. Among the properties of individual things, some are essential, others accidental; the accidental properties of a thing are those it can lose without losing its identity - such as wearing a hat, if you are a man. The question now arises: given two individual things belonging to the same species, do they always differ in essence, or is it possible for the essence to be exactly the same in both? Aquinas held the latter view as regards material substances, the former as regards those that are immaterial. Duns said that there are *always* differences of essence between two different individual things. The view of Aquinas depends upon the theory that pure matter consists of undifferentiated parts, which are distinguished solely by difference of position in space. Thus a person, consisting of mind and body, may differ *physically* from another person solely by the spatial position of his body. (This might happen with identical twins, theoretically.) Duns, on the other hand, holds that if things are distinct, they must be distinguished by some qualitative difference.

Various stages have to be traversed before we can state this problem in modern terms. The first step, which was taken by Leibniz, was to get rid of the distinction between essential and accidental properties, which, like many that the scholastics took over from Aristotle, turns out to be unreal as soon as we attempt to state it carefully. We thus have, instead of 'essence', 'all the propositions that are true of the thing in question'. (In general, however, spatial and temporal position would still be excluded.) Leibniz contends that it is impossible for two things to be exactly alike in this sense; this is his principle of the 'identity of indiscernibles'. This principle was criticized by physicists, who maintained that two particles of matter might differ solely as regards position in space and time - a view which has been rendered more difficult by relativity, which reduces space and time to relations. A further step is required in modernizing the problem, and that is, to get rid of the conception of 'substance'. When this is done, a

'thing' has to be a bundle of qualities, since there is no longer any kernel of pure 'thinghood'. It would seem to follow that, if 'substance' is rejected, we must take a view more akin to that of Duns than to that of Aquinas. The Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) was a great admirer of Duns and translated his 'principle of individuation' - *haecceitas* (thisness) in Latin - by a word of his own invention 'inscape'.

WILLIAM OF OCCAM

William of Occam was, after Aquinas, the most important schoolman. The circumstances of his life are very imperfectly known. He was born around 1288 and died on April 10th, but whether in 1347 or 1348 is uncertain. (The Black Death was raging in 1348, so that this is perhaps the more probable year.) Most people say he was born at Ockham in Surrey (just off the A3 north east of Guildford), but others prefer Ockham in Yorkshire. He studied at Oxford, and then at Paris, where he was first the pupil and afterwards the rival of Duns. He was involved in the quarrel between the Franciscans order and Pope John XXII (1249-1334) on the subject of poverty. The Pope had persecuted the Spirituals, with the support of Michael of Cesena (*ca.* 1270-1342), Minister General of the Order. There had been an arrangement by which property left to the friars was given by them to the Pope, who allowed them the benefit of it without the sin of ownership. This was ended by John XXII, who said they should accept outright ownership. At this a majority of the Order, headed by Michael of Cesena, rebelled. Occam, who had been summoned to Avignon by the Pope to answer charges of heresy on other grounds, sided with Michael of Cesena. Both were excommunicated in 1328 but escaped from Avignon, and took refuge with the Emperor Louis. Louis was one of the two claimants to the Empire, being the one favoured by Germany, but the other was favoured by the Pope. The Pope excommunicated Louis, who appealed against him to a General Council. The Pope himself was then accused of heresy. It is said that Occam, on meeting the Emperor, said: 'Do you defend me with the sword, and I will defend you with the pen'. At any rate, he settled in Munich, under the protection of the Emperor, and there wrote political treatises concerning the relative authority of of the spiritual and temporal powers. He was officially rehabilitated by Pope Innocent VI in 1359.

Occam worked out a completely democratic method of electing the General Council, and could thus be held to anticipate the Reformation. But his standpoint was different from that afterwards adopted, in theory, by the Protestants. The Protestants claimed the right of private judgment, and were not willing to submit to a General Council. They held that religious belief is not a matter to be decided by any governmental machinery. Occam, on the contrary, still aimed at preserving the unity of the Catholic faith, but wished this to be done by democratic means, not by the papal absolutism. (The same is true of many Roman Catholics today). In practice, most Protestants, when they acquired the government, merely substituted the King for the Pope, and thus secured neither liberty of private judgment nor a democratic method of deciding doctrinal questions. But in their opposition to the Pope they found support in the doctrines of Occam. Of all the schoolmen, Occam was the one whom Luther preferred. It must be said that a considerable section of Protestants held to the doctrine of private judgment even where the State was Protestant. This was the chief point of difference between Independents and Presbyterians in the English Civil War.

Occam's political works are written in the style of philosophic disputations, with arguments for and against various theses, sometimes not reaching any conclusion. We are accustomed to a more forthright kind of political propaganda, but in his day the form he chose was probably effective. A few samples will illustrate his method and outlook. There is a long treatise called 'Eight Questions Concerning the Power of the Pope'. The first question is: Whether one man can rightfully be supreme both in Church and State? The second: Is secular authority derived immediately from God or not? Third: Has the Pope the right to grant secular jurisdiction to the Emperor and other princes? Fourth: Does election by the electors give full powers to the German king? Fifth and sixth: What rights does the Church acquire through the right of bishops to anoint kings? Seventh: Is a coronation ceremony valid if performed by the wrong archbishop? Eighth: Does election by the electors give the German king the title of Emperor? All these were, at the time, burning questions of practical politics. Another treatise is on the question whether a prince can obtain the goods of the Church without the Pope's permission. This was concerned to justify Edward III in taxing the clergy for his war with France, Edward being an ally of the Emperor. Then comes a 'Consultation on a matrimonial cause', on the question whether the Emperor was justified in marrying his cousin. It will be seen that Occam did his best to deserve the protection of the Emperor's sword.

As to his purely philosophical doctrines, Occam was mainly concerned to restore a pure Aristotle, freed from both Augustinian and Arabic influences. [A further note on Occam is at Appendix]. He is best known for a maxim which is not to be found in his works, but has acquired the name of 'Occam's razor'. This says that: 'Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity'. Although he did not say this, he said something which has much the same effect, namely: 'It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer'. That is to say, if everything in some science can be interpreted without assuming this or that hypothetical entity, there is no ground for assuming it. This is a most fruitful principle in logical analysis. By insisting on the possibility of studying logic and human knowledge without reference to metaphysics and theology, Occam's work encouraged scientific research. The Augustinians, he said, erred in first supposing things unintelligible and men unintelligent, and then adding a light from Infinity by which knowledge became possible. He agreed in this with Aquinas, but differed in emphasis, for Aquinas was primarily a theologian, and Occam was, so far as logic is concerned, primarily a secular philosopher. His attitude gave confidence to students of particular problems, for instance, his immediate follower Nicholas of Oresme (d. 1382), who investigated planetary theory. This man was, to a certain extent, a precursor of Copernicus; he set forth both the geocentric and the heliocentric theories, and said that each would explain all the facts known in his day, so that there was no way of deciding between them.

After William of Occam there were no more great scholastics. The next time for great philosophers began in the late Renaissance. The first of these was Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527).

Sources

This note has relied heavily on three main sources:

1. Bertrand Russell. *A History of Western Philosophy*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1946. Especially Chapter XIV 'Franciscan Schoolmen'.
2. John Moorman. *A History of the Franciscan Order*. Oxford University Press. 1968. Especially Chapter 21 'The Schoolmen'. *The Franciscans in England*, Mowbray, Oxford, 1974
3. Wikipedia entries for Haymo of Faversham, Alexander of Hales, Adam Marsh and John Pecham.

Use has also been made of:

4. *The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins*. W.H.Gardner and N.H.MacKenzie (Eds.). Oxford University paperback 1970. p.xxi.
5. D.W.Whitfield, *The Third Order of St. Francis in Mediaeval England* in 'Franciscan Studies', Vol. 13, No1, March 1953
6. Personal correspondence with Fr, Justin OFM December 1982, Bishop John Moorman, March 1983 and Br. Edward SSF, August 1982.

Appendix.

Philosophy of William of Occam (courtesy of Bertrand Russell)

In logic, though apparently not in metaphysics, Occam was a nominalist; the nominalists of the fifteenth century looked upon him as the founder of their school. He thought that Aristotle had been misinterpreted by the Scotists. The result had been that logic and theory of knowledge had become dependent on metaphysics and theology. Occam set to work to separate them again. For Occam, logic is an instrument for the philosophy of nature, which can be independent of metaphysics. Logic is the analysis of discursive science; science is about things, but logic is not. Things are individual, but among terms there are universals; logic treats of universals, while science uses them without discussing them. Logic is concerned with terms or concepts, not as psychical states, but as having meaning. 'Man is a species' is not a proposition of logic, because it requires knowledge of man. Logic deals with things fabricated by the mind within itself, which cannot exist except through the existence of reason. A concept is a *natural* sign, a word is a *conventional* sign. We must distinguish when we are speaking of a word as a thing and when we are using it as having meaning, otherwise we may fall into fallacies such as: 'Man is a species, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a species'.

Terms which point at things are called 'terms of first intention'; terms which point at terms are called 'terms of second intention'. The terms in science are of first intention; in logic, of second. *Metaphysical* terms are peculiar in that they signify both things signified by words of first intention and things signified by words of second intention. There are exactly six metaphysical terms: being, thing, something, one, true, good. These terms have the peculiarity that they can all be predicated of each other. But logic can be pursued independently of them. Understanding is of things, not of forms produced by the mind; these are not *what* is understood, but that *by* which things are understood. Universals, in logic, are only terms or concepts predicable of many other terms or concepts. *Universal, genus, species* are terms of second intention, and therefore cannot mean *things*. But since *one* and *being* are convertible, if a universal existed, it would be one, and an individual thing. A universal is merely a sign of many things. In explaining human knowledge, Occam never allows universals to be *things*. Socrates is similar to Plato, he says, but not in virtue of a third *thing* called similarity. Similarity is a term of second intention, and is in the mind. (All this is good). Propositions about future contingents, according to Occam, are not yet either true or false. He makes no attempt to reconcile this view with divine omniscience. Here, as elsewhere, he keeps logic free from metaphysics and theology.

Some samples of Occam's discussions may be useful.

He asks: 'Whether that which is known by the understanding first according to a primacy of generation is the individual'.

Against: The universal is the first and proper object of the understanding.

For: The object of sense and the object of understanding are the same, but the individual is

the first object of sense.

Accordingly, the meaning of the question must be stated. (Presumably, because both arguments seem strong.)

He continues: 'The thing outside the soul which is not a sign is understood first by such knowledge (i.e. by knowledge which is individual), therefore the individual is known first, since everything outside the soul is individual'. He goes on to say that abstract knowledge always presupposes knowledge that is 'intuitive' (i.e. of perception), and this is caused by individual things. He then enumerates four doubts which may arise, and proceeds to resolve them. He concludes with an affirmative answer to his original question, but adds that 'the universal is the first object by primacy of adequation, not by the primacy of generation'.

To the question 'whether the sensitive soul and the intellective soul are really distinct in man', he answers that they are, though this is hard to prove. One of his arguments is that we may with our appetites desire something that with our understanding we reject; therefore appetite and understanding belong to different subjects. Another argument is that sensations are subjectively in the sensitive soul, but not subjectively in the intellective soul. Again: the sensitive soul is extended and material, while the intellective soul is neither. Four objections are considered, all theological, but they are answered. The view taken by Occam on this question is not, perhaps, what might be expected. However, he agrees with Aquinas and disagrees with Averroes in thinking that each man's intellect is his own, not something impersonal.